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We study information revelation in markets with pairwise meetings. First, we reconsider the one-sided 
case within constant entry flow model. The same question has been studied in an identical framework in 
Serrano and Yosha (1993). We prove that there exists an additional equilibrium not detected by Serrano 
and Yosha (1993). We show that this equilibrium is characterized by incomplete information revelation. 
Until now, no equilibrium with incomplete revelation of information was known in this model. Our 
second main result is that, at this new equilibrium, information revelation is worse when frictions are 
weaker. One prove also that increasing the frictions is a Pareto improvement. Finally, we show that those 
properties should also characterize some equilibria of the two-sided case studied by Wolinsky (1990). 
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In the general equilibrium approach of competitive markets, trade is cen-
tralized: all sellers and buyers of a particular commodity meet in the same
location, and all trade takes place simultaneously at the same price. A cen-
tral mechanism, often presented as an auctioneer, is needed to choose the
price which equates demand with supply. Moreover, no trade takes place
until the price has been made public. Frictions are completely absent of
the model since nothing creates an obstacle to trade. By modifying this
setup, one can introduce asymmetric information about the value of the
good being traded, i.e. there is uncertainty about common values. Ana-
lyzing information revelation in this context leads to the conclusion that
unfettered market prices aggregate and reveal all relevant information that
is dispersed asymmetrically among agents - so that prices allow the nal
allocation of ressources to be ecient.1
Some assumptions as well as certain conclusions, are dicult to accept
as obvious. Indeed, it is quite natural to be reluctant to endorse the extreme
centralization or the conclusion of full information revelation which seems to
be battered by facts at least in numerous situations if not all. So, we can be
interested by the literature begun by Wolinsky (1990). In that approach, the
main goal is to study the information revelation and eciency properties of
a decentralized market, where there is no auctioneer and transactions take
place via pairwise meetings of agents.
In his seminal paper, Wolinsky (1990) addresed the following qualitative
question to what extent is the information revealed to uninformed agents
through the trading process, when the market is in some sense frictionless?
More precisely, does the decentralized process give rise to full revelation re-
sults as derived by the literature on rational expectations for centralized and
competitive environments? The main message was rather pessimistic since
it turned out that the information is not fully revealed to uninformed agents,
even when the market is in some sense approximately frictionless.
Wolinsky (1990) does not imply anything concerning the impact of possi-
ble frictions on the eciency of the market. In its current state, the literature
is silent on the issue of the second best : When frictions are unavoidable;
1The rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is an equilibrium concept used in the
GE framework. In a centralized analogue of the case we study, it exhibits full information
revelation and is an interim incentive ecient mechanism, a sort of First Welfare Theorem.
This eciency concept is presented in Holmstrom and Myerson (1983). A denition of
REE and a discussion of its information-revelation properties can be found in Radner
(1982).
1will the lowest frictions imply the most complete information revelation ?
In order to address this question, we consider an equilibrium with incom-
plete revelation of information in the model of Serrano and Yosha (1993).
Their model is very close to the one of Wolinsky (1990) but slightly less
complicated. Both models are built on a market with sellers on one side and
buyers on the other one. Wolinsky (1990) analyses a situation where unin-
formed agents belong to both sides of the market while only some buyers
are uninformed in the case studied by Serrano and Yosha (1993).
Our main result is that frictions favour information revelation. One
could however object that what matters is not information revelation but
the welfare and we hence analyze the issue from a welfarist point of view.
Actually, the result is rather reinforced than weakened by the modication
of perspective. Not only does a rise of the frictions increase the total welfare,
but it is even a Pareto improvement.
Readers familiar with the literature could be surprised by the fact that
we speak about an equilibrium with incomplete information revelation in the
one-sided case. The construction of this equilibrium is also a substantial part
of our contribution. On one hand, it is not so surprising since the existence of
this kind of equilibrium was not completely excluded by Serrano and Yosha
(1993). On the other hand, until now it was considered as certain that, for
the parameters values that we use, no equilibrium could imply incomplete
revelation of information.
In order to generalize our result, we prove that an equivalent equilibrium
exists in the two-sided case. So, the idea that frictions favour information
revelation extends at least to some equilibria of the more general case that
Wolinsky (1990) considers.
While the message of Wolinsky (1990) is pessimistic: no equilibrium im-
plies complete information revelation when the frictions disappear; the one-
sided case, even with our contribution, brings a conclusion more optimistic
since there exist equilibria characterized by complete information revela-
tion when the market becomes approximately frictionless. This dierence
in term of results between Serrano and Yosha (1993) and Wolinsky (1990)
is usually explained by a noise force created by the presence of uninformed
agents on both sides of the market in Wolinsky (1990). Our results do not
challenge completely this view but modify nevertheless the mechanism and
the necessity of noise force to prevent complete information revelation. So,
our results contribute also to improving our understanding of the dierences
between the one- and two-sided cases.
In the rst section, we present the model. The second section provides
some characterizations of the equilibria that are useful in the following sec-
2tions. The third section introduces the new equilibrium. The properties of
this equilibrium are analyzed in section four. The fth section presents the
equivalent equilibrium in the two-sided case. The noise force is discussed in
section six. In the last section, we conclude.
1 The Model
We consider the model of Serrano and Yosha (1993) and study it without
assuming an a priori stationarity of the equilibrium.
Times runs discretely from 1 to 1. Each period is identical. On one
side, there are sellers who have one unit of an indivisible good to sell. On the
other side, there are buyers who want to buy one unit of this good. In each
period, a continuum of measure M of new sellers and the same quantity of
buyers enter the market. The agents quit the market when they have traded.
Hence, the number of sellers is always equal to the number of buyers.
There exist two possible states of the world, which inuence the payo
of the agents. If the state is low (L), the cost of production (cL) for the
sellers but also the utility (uL) of the buyers are low. If the state is high
(H), the corresponding parameters (cH and uH) are high. The state remains
identical during all the periods.
All sellers know the state of the world, whereas not all of the buyers
are perfectly informed. Among the newcomers, there is a fraction xB of
buyers who are perfectly informed. The remaining buyers are uninformed
and possess a common prior belief H 2 [0;1] that the state is H and
(1   H) that the state is L.
At each period, all the agents are randomly matched with an agent of
the other type.2 At each meeting, the agents can announce one of two prices
: pH and pL. If both agents announce the same price, trade occurs at this
price. If a seller announces a lower price, trade occurs at an intermediate
price pM. If a seller announces a higher price, trade does not occur. The
dierent parameters are assumed to be ordered such that :
cL < pL < uL < pM < cH < pH < uH (1)
Remaining on the market implies a zero payo. The instantaneous payo
when a transaction occurs is the price minus the cost for a seller and the
utility minus the price for a buyer. All agents discount the future by a
constant factor .
2See Due and Sun (2007) for a rigorous proof of the existence of independent random
matching between two continua.
3In state H, we call pH the good price because trade at other prices
implies a loss for the sellers. Similarly, the price pL is the good price in state
L because trade at other prices involves loss for the buyers.
After each meeting with a seller who announces pH, a buyer will update
his belief H according to Bayes' rule. If an uninformed buyer meets a seller
who announces pL, he will know that the state of the world is L, but it does
not really matter any more, since this buyer will trade and leave the market.
It is convenient to say that a seller (resp. a buyer) plays soft when he
announces pL (resp. pH) and tough when he announces pH (resp. pL). When
an agent plays soft, he is ensured to trade and to quit the market. Hence,
to describe completely the strategy of an agent, it is sucient to give the
number of periods in which he plays tough. The strategy of an agent might
depend on the period of entry on the market. We note nSH(t) the number
of periods during which a seller plays tough when he enters at time t on a
market which is in state H. Similarly, we dene nSL(t), nBH(t), nBL(t).
Finally, we dene nB(t) as the strategy of an uninformed buyer, which is
independent of the state of the world.
An equilibrium is a prole of strategies where each agent is maximizing
his expected payo, given the strategies of the other agents. All parameters
(pH;pM;pL;cH;cL;uH;uL;xB;;H) are common knowledge.
We dene now the proportions of agents who play tough when state is L.
The proportion of the total number of buyers in the market who at period
t announce pL is called Bl
L. Similarly, Sh
L is the proportion of sellers who at
period t announce pH. These values are known to all agents. Naturally, Bl
H
and Sh
H are the equivalent proportions when the world is in state H. Let
KH and KL be the total number of sellers (and therefore for buyers) in the
market in state H and in state L. We are at a steady state when KH, KL




H - are constant.
2 Characterization of the Equilibria
In the following claim, we characterize the equilibrium strategies of informed
buyers and of sellers in state H.
Claim 1 In any equilibrium nSH = 1, nBL = 1 and nBH = 0.
Proof An informed seller in state H knows that his payo will be nega-
tive if he trades at an other price than pH. Since the payo of perpetual
disagreement is 0, he will always prefer to play tough even if it implies a
long delay before trading. The reasoning is identical for an informed buyer
4in state L. An informed buyer in state H will understand that nSH = 1
and thus he will never trade while he plays tough. Playing tough only de-
lays the payo. So, it is better for this kind of buyer to play immediately soft.
Concerning notations, VSL(n;Bl
L) indicates the expected payo for a
seller in state L when he plays tough during n periods. By denition, the
optimal strategy for an agent maximizes its expected payo. So, an equilib-





Similarly, we denote VB(n;H;Sh
L;Sh
H) the expected payo for an unin-






The focus on steady-state imposes the following restrictions:
M = KH(1   Sh
HBl
H) (4)
















(1   xB)(nB + 1) + xB
(9)
The two rst equations are the steady state conditions for the market
size in the two states of the world. M is the number of entering buyers
(resp. sellers). This number has to be equal to the number of exiting
buyers (resp. sellers). This last number is equal to the total amount of
buyers (resp. sellers) in the market (KH or KL according to the state of
the world) multiplied by the probability of reaching an agreement. The
unique possibility for a match to end on a disagreement is when the meeting
happens between two tough agents. So, the probability of disagreement in





to reach an agreement is then given by 1   Sh
HBl
H (resp. 1   Sh
LBl
L).
Equations (6), (7) and (8) are the conditions which ensure the stationar-
ity for the proportions of tough buyers in state L, and of tough sellers in the
two states. The left-hand side is the number of agents who play soft. The
5right-hand side is the number of buyers who have switched during this pe-
riod to playing soft. This is also the total number of buyers who are playing
soft because any buyer who plays soft in the previous period has for sure
transacted and has left the market.
We do not write the stationarity condition for the proportion of tough
buyers in state H. Actually, this condition is identical to (4). The expla-
nation is the following one. Since sellers are all tough, trade - and therefore
exit - occurs whenever a buyer switches to soft. Thus, the number of buyers
who play soft in a given period is also the number of buyers who trade and
exit the market in this period.
We need an additional equation to complete the system which is equation
(9). In state H, since all the sellers are playing tough, a buyer who plays
tough does not trade. Therefore, all the uninformed buyers who entered the
market nB   1 periods ago or later are still in the market and are playing
tough. Their number is M(1 xB)nB. The uninformed buyers who entered
the market nB periods ago are also in the market but are playing soft.
Their number is M(1   xB). Uninformed buyers who entered previously
have already left the market. Thus, there is no more uninformed buyers in
the market. Informed buyers remain in the market for exactly one period.
Therefore the total number of buyers in the market is M(1   xB) + M(1  
xB)nB + MxB, and the fraction of tough buyers is as described in (9).
3 The Elusive Equilibrium
In a rst step, we assume that nB = 0 and Sh
L < 1. Hence, the characteriza-
tion, established in the previous section, takes a particular form given these
assumptions (nB = 0 and Sh
L < 1).
The second step is devoted to the determination of nSL, the best strategy
of a seller in state L.
Then we have to check in a third step that nB = 0 is indeed the best
response for an uninformed buyer.
First Step
Let us write the particular form of the characterization when nB = 0 and
Sh
L < 1.
6M = KH (10)











H = 1 (13)
Sh
L = 1   (Bl
L)nSL (14)
Bl




nB = 0 (17)
nSH = +1 (18)
nBL = +1 (19)
nBH = 0 (20)
Second Step
This step is devoted to determining nSL, the best strategy of a seller in
state L. In that order, we dene VSL(Bl
L) which is the dierence in term








L)(pM   cL) + Bl
L(pL   cL)]
  [((1   Bl









+ (pH   pM)
 Bl
L[X   Bl
LY ] + Z (21)
In the rst equality, the two rst lines correspond to playing tough today
and soft tomorrow while the third one corresponds to playing soft today.
If a seller plays soft today, he has a probability (1   Bl
L) to meet a soft
buyer and consequently to obtain a payo (pM   cL), otherwise (i.e. with
probability Bl
L) he will get (pL   cL) due to a meeting with a tough buyer.
7If a seller announces pH, he will reach an agreement only if he is matched
with a soft buyer. It occurs with a probability (1   Bl
L) and the payo is
then (pH   cL). Otherwise, with a probability Bl
L, he will remain in the
market. In the next period, if he plays soft, he has an expected payo equal
to the expression between brackets which must be multiplied by the discount
factor  because trade occurs one period later.
For further use, we denote Bl
L() the root of VSL(Bl
L). Using (12), we





L(). It will be later useful to know that
lim!1 Bl
L() = 1. It follows from continuity of Bl
L() and the fact that
B(1) = 1. It will also be useful to compute lim!1 Sh
L() = 1.
When VSL(Bl
L) > 0, it means that a seller who thinks of playing soft
today would get a better expected payo by playing tough at least one period
more. Since it is true for all the sellers at any point of time, it implies that
all the sellers will play tough. On the contrary, if VSL(Bl
L) < 0 then all
the sellers will play soft. Finally, VSL(Bl
L) = 0 leads the sellers to be
indierent between all the strategies, and the proportion of tough sellers
may a priori take any value. So, optimal strategies are such that
VSL(Bl
L) > 0 =) Sh
L = 1 (22)
VSL(Bl
L) < 0 =) Sh
L = 0 (23)
VSL(Bl
L) = 0 =) Sh
L 2 [0;1] (24)
We have previously assumed Sh
L < 1, so we do not consider Sh
L = 1. If Sh
L = 0
then nB = 0 cannot be the best response when the frictions disappear.
Indeed, nB = 0 implies an instantaneous loss if the state of the world is
L while nB = 1 ensures a trade with a positive instantaneous payo, the
unique negative term comes from the cost of delay which disappears at the
same time than the frictions. One can check more formally that nB = 0 is
not a best response when Sh
L = 0 by observing that VB introduced later
is positive if the proportion of tough sellers is nil in state L. So, if it exists,
our equilibrium is such that VSL(Bl





L() at the equilibrium.
We are interested by the strategy nSL. Individually, the sellers are indif-





L(). If this equation gives us an integer for nSL,
there is no additional complication. Otherwise, one can say without loss
of generality that a proportion rS chooses nSL = +1 while the remaining
part 1   rS adopts nSL = 0. The amount of soft sellers in the market is
given by KH(1 Sh
L). M(1 rS) is the number of sellers who have switched
8during this period to playing soft. This is also the total number of sell-
ers who are playing soft because any seller who plays soft in the previous
period has for sure transacted and has left the market. Hence, we have
KH(1   Sh




We started this section by assuming nB = 0 and Sh
L < 1. In the second step,
we determined nSL according to the initial assumption. The strategy nSL
that we found ensures Sh
L < 1. It remains to be proven that nB = 0 is indeed
the best strategy for an uninformed buyer. In that order and similarly to
the previous step, we dene VB(Sh
L) as the dierence of expected payo
between nB = 1 and nB = 0.
VB(Sh
L)
= H(uH   pH)
+ (1   H)(1   Sh
L)(uL   pL)
+ (1   H)Sh
L[(uL   pM) + Sh
L(pM   pH)]
  H(uH   pH)   (1   H)[(uL   pM) + Sh
L(pM   pH)]
The last line corresponds to the payo obtained when playing soft today.
The payo in state H which is equal to (uH   pH) is multiplied by the
probability that the state is H. The term in brackets, which is multiplied
by the probability that the state is L, is evidently the payo in state L. This
payo can be written as (1 Sh
L)(uL pM) (i.e. the probability to meet a soft
seller times the payo involved by this meeting) plus Sh
L(uL   pH) (i.e. the
probability to meet a tough seller times the payo involved). The three rst
lines correspond to playing tough today and soft tomorrow. The meaning of
the rst line is obvious. It is just important not to forget the discount factor
. Indeed, if the state is H, a buyer who announces pL does not trade. In
the case where the state is L, there is a probability (1   Sh
L) that a buyer
meets a soft seller and obtains today (uL pL). If a buyer does not have this
luck, which happens with probability Sh
L, he will have tomorrow an expected
payo equal to the expression in brackets. Once again, we must not forget
the discount factor.
Obviously, VB  0 means that nB = 0 is better strategy than nB = 1.
What about the other possible strategies? All the dierences in expected
payo between nB = k + 1 and nB = k are smaller than VB(Sh
L). Indeed,
they will take the same form than VB(Sh
L) but with H replaced by its
9updated value. Note that the expression is decreasing in H while due to the
Bayes' rule used, the updating process of H is increasing. Finally, we get
that VB  0 implies that nB = 0 is the best response for an uninformed
buyer.
Hence, we will check that we have eectively VB  0 at the equilibrium
proposed. First, it is easy to check that lim!1 VB(Sh
L()) = 0. Then, one
can compute its derivative with respect to . If this derivative is positive at
 = 1, it means that 9  such that VB(Sh




= H(uH   pH)   (1   H)(pM   uL)Sh
L()
  (1   H)(pH   pM)(Sh
L())2





















while the derivative of Bl
L() evaluated at  = 1 is equal to
(pH   pL)(pM   cL)   (pH   pM)(pL   cL) + (pH   cL)(pM   pL)
2(pM   pL)(pH   pL)
  1 (27)




 = 1 :
H >
(1   xB)(pH   uL) + xB(pL   cL)
(1   xB)(uH   uL) + xB(pL   cL)
=  H (28)
10The Equilibrium







L() of sellers adopts nSL = +1
The remaining part chooses nSL = 0
4 Information Revelation and Welfare
Until now, we said nothing about the properties of the equilibrium presented
in Proposition 1. Those properties are the object of this section. In the rst
subsection, we discuss information revelation. Since our result contradicts
some assertions presented in Serrano and Yosha (2003), it is important to
develop and neatly present our arguments. The second part is devoted to
the welfare analysis.
Information Revelation
In the rational expectations literature the concept of information revelation
is quite clear: prices reveal all available information about the state of the
world. Even ignorant at the beginning, any agent is able to say what is the
state of the world by observing the prices. The natural translation of that
concept in our setup is that no trade takes place at a wrong price, i.e. at a
price distinct from pi at state i = L;H.
In our model, it is not possible that trade occurs at a wrong price when
the state of the world is H. Indeed, at that state, sellers reject all prices
which dier from pH. We denote fB the proportion of uninformed buyers
who trade at a wrong price in state L. In case of complete information reve-
lation, fB = 0. Otherwise, fB can be used to see if revelation of information
is more or less complete.
Now, let us note that the proportion fB is exactly equal to Sh
L, the
proportion of sellers who play tough. This proportion tends to 1 when 
tends to 1. So, one can write
11lim
!1
fB = 1 (29)
It means that all uninformed buyers trade at a wrong price when the
market becomes frictionless. One cannot imagine a worst situation in term
of information revelation. Another important property is that the derivative
of Sh
L with respect to  is positive (at least for high value of ). This
property is naturally shared by fB. Hence, increased frictions lead to a
better information revelation.
The limit of fB that we get is in contradiction with a remark in Serrano
and Yosha (1993) which says that Curiously, if trade in the limit does occur
at the wrong price, the limiting fraction of wrong price trades is a precise
number determined by [...]
(1   xB) H
1 H(uH   pH)   (pL   cL)
(1   xB)[(pH   uL)   (pL   cL)]
The number given by this expression is typically dierent from 1.
Actually, the validity of this assertion is limited to equilibria where nB
is not a corner solution of the uninformed buyers' problem. Indeed, for an
intermediary step in Serrano and Yosha (1993)3, the equality @
@xVB = 0 is
used to characterize the optimal nB. This equality is a rst-order condition
which is relevant only for interior solutions. Clearly in our case, the strategy
for uninformed buyers is a corner strategy.4
Note that our condition (32) is exactly the condition that implies that
the number given by Serrano and Yosha (2003) is larger than 1. Actually, it
is not so surprising. It is indeed in that area that we would have suspected
the existence of a corner solution for uninformed buyers. Intuitively, a lower
number for nB implies a larger number of trade occuring at the wrong
price. When the number given in Serrano and Yosha (1993) tends (from
below) to 1, it is right to think that nB tends to zero. Once the zero is
reached, nB cannot decrease further and we expect indeed that, if it exists,
the equilibrium with a corner strategy for uninformed buyers appears at
that place.
Finally, Serrano and Yosha (1993) acknowledged the possibility of exis-
tence of some interior equilibria with incomplete revelation of information.
However, our equilibrium is a corner one, and hence has not been stricto
3The step 3 of the proof of proposition 2, see at p. 493
4It is maybe useful to underline that our new equilibrium does not invalidate Propo-
sitions 1 and 2 in Serrano and Yosha (1993). Only corollary following proposition 2 and
some parts of proposition 3 have to be reevaluated.
12sensu considered as possible by Serrano and Yosha (1993). Nevertheless,
at the frontier, when the fraction here above is equal to 1, our equilibrium
becomes interior. So, it is reasonable to believe that the equilibria which
are not excluded by Serrano and Yosha (1993) really exist. However, it does
not seem easy to get an explicit description of those equilibria. Moreover,
we have no idea about the evolution of information revelation with respect
to  for those equilibria.
Welfare Analysis
A welfare analysis for this kind of model is not a novelty in the literature.
Serrano and Yosha (1996) perform such an analysis for the one- and two-
sided cases. Their main message is that information revelation and welfare
go in the same direction. But their interest was limited to what happens
when  tends to 1. So, with them, we know that when  tends to 1 we
do not reach the ideal in term of welfare. But we do not know how to
approach this ideal since Serrano and Yosha (1996) use a central planner
to dene this ideal but are silent on ways to implement this ideal. In what
follows, we will study the evolution of expected utility, at the equilibrium
established here above, for the dierent agents when  varies. We discover
that ex-ante, a decrease in  prots to all the agents. Hence, we learn that
the disappearance of frictions is not a desirable goal in all the equilibria.
Let us consider the forces aecting the welfare when the frictions vary.
First, there is a direct eect. All the agents who do not trade immediately
incur a cost of delay. This cost is larger when  is lower. Then, there are
the second-order eects. The level of friction aects the strategy of the
agents. In our case, the only agents who vary their strategy are the sellers
in state L. When  decreases, sellers reduce their misrepresentation. The
proportion of tough sellers goes in the same direction than . As we will see,
this channel will create a positive impact of increasing frictions (decreasing
) which overcomes the direct eect for all the agents. For the buyers, it is
due to the fact that their opponents are readier to reach an agreement. For
the sellers, it is due to a kind of externality.
State H In this state, our equilibrium implies immediate trading for all the
agents. So, a modication of  has neither a direct nor an indirect inuence.
So, to determine the benet implied by a change in the level of frictions, one
has to consider only what happens in state L. An appealing consequence
is that a benevolent planner in charge of determining the optimal level of 
13will choose exactly the same value, irrespective from his knowledge or belief
about the state of the world.
State L The results are less straightforward for this stage.
The least surprising result concerns the uninformed buyers. Those agents
are not aected by the cost of delay since they trade instantaneously (indeed,
they play always soft). The proportion of tough sellers evolves in the same
direction than . When this proportion is lower, the probability to trade
at the good price increases and thus also the expected payo. Hence, an
increase in the level of frictions (a lower ) is a good thing for uninformed
buyers since the incentives for the sellers to misrepresent is less important.
At rst glance, the analysis for the sellers may seem quite complex. Ac-
tually it is not, at least if we remember that, at the equilibrium considered,
the sellers are indierent between all the strategies (VSL = 0). As a con-
sequence, we can study what happens for a seller who plays immediately
soft and we will learn what happens for all the sellers. Thus, the expected
payo is given by
VSL = Bl
L(pL   cL) + (1   Bl
L)(pM   cL) = (pM   cL)   Bl
L(pM   pL) (30)
A seller who plays always soft is not aected by the cost of delay since he
reaches immediately an agreement. Unsurprisingly, this payo is negatively
aected by the proportion of tough buyers who do not accept a price as
protable for sellers as the one accepted by soft buyers. The proportion of
tough buyers evolves in the same direction than . Hence, an increase in the
level of frictions (a lower ) is a good thing for sellers since it increases the
proportion of soft buyers on the market.
It may be interesting to underline that if the proportion of tough buyers
evolves with , it is due to the modication of the strategy of the sellers.
When there are more soft sellers, the tough buyers reach more quickly an
agreement and are thus faster to quit the market. Automatically, it increases
the proportion of soft buyers which is a good thing for the sellers. So, there
exists an externality between the sellers.
For informed buyers, there are two forces which go in opposite direc-
tions. The cost of delay increases with the frictions but the probability of
disagreement (which is equal to (Sh
L)) decreases at the same time. It is not











(uL   pL) (31)
14We are interested by dVBL
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(1   Sh
L)2 (32)
This expression leads to an indeterminacy of the type 0
0 when we are inter-





























d  + Sh
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(33)
Once again, we get an indeterminacy of the type 0
0 so we apply a second































2xB(pH   cL)(pL   cL)(pM   pL)
(1   xB)(pH   pL)3 < 0 (35)
5 Equivalent Equilibrium in the Two-Sided Case
The results exposed so far already constitute an interesting contribution to
the literature. Nevertheless, we would be happier if we had some evidence
that the results are not limited to this model. In this section, we establish
in the two-sided case as considered by Wolinsky (1990) the existence of
an equilibrium which strongly resembles the equilibrium proposed in the
previous sections.
This exercise is thus interesting, rst by extending the validity of the
intuition that frictions may improve the situation in term of information
revelation and even in the sense of Pareto. This equilibrium then also leads
us to reconsider the way noise force operates, thus improving our compre-
hension of the role played by the dierent forces at work in this kind of
framework.
We will proceed in two steps. First we characterize (partially) the equi-
librium. Then we prove that such an equilibrium indeed exists.
155.1 Partial Characterization
As in the one-sided case, an equilibrium is characterized by conditions which
ensure that all the agents play a best response to the other actions and by
conditions which ensure the stationarity. We will consider the second ones
only at the end of this section. For the rst conditions, we need to introduce
the equivalent 's which are :
VB = H(1   Sh
H)(pM   pL) + (1   H)(1   Sh
L)(pM   pL)
  H(Sh
H)2(pH   pM)   (1   H)(Sh
L)2(pH   pM)
+ HSh
H[(uH   pM)   (uH   pH)]
+ (1   H)Sh
L[(uL   pM)   (uL   pH)]
VS = (1   H)(1   Bl
L)(pH   pM) + H(1   Bl
H)(pH   pM)
  (1   H)(Bl
L)2(pM   pL)   H(Bl
H)2(pM   pL)
+ (1   H)Bl
L[(pM   cL)   (pL   cL)]
+ HBl
H[(pM   cH)   (pL   cH)]
VBH = Sh
H[( uH + pH   pM + pL) + (uH   pM)
  Sh
H(pH   pM)] + (pM   pL)
VSL = Bl
L[( pH + pM   pL + cL) + (pM   cL)
  Bl
L(pM   pL)] + (pH   pM)
Those expressions are more complex than the ones used in the one-sided
case. Nevertheless, the logic of those expressions is completely similar.
We do not write VSH and VBL because claim 1 is also valid in the
two-sided case for informed sellers in state H and for informed buyers in
state L. It is not the case for informed buyers in state H because we cannot
exclude a priori the possibility to meet a soft seller in state H. Indeed, now
there are some uninformed sellers.
What we call an equivalent equilibrium is an equilibrium where the
agents present in the two models adopt qualitatively the same strategies.
We would like that uninformed buyers play always soft. So, we will impose
VB  0. Similarly for informed buyers in state H, we impose VBH  0.
As in the one-sided case, we expect that informed sellers in state L are in-
dierent between all the strategies. Hence, we would like VSL = 0. Since
there was no uninformed sellers in the one-sided case, we do not know a
priori the sign VS has to take. Nevertheless, if some sellers play soft in
state L, it would create for informed buyers an incentive to play tough, at
least for high . To avoid this case, we force VS to be equal or larger than
0.
16To sum up, the wished equivalent equilibrium would be such that5
VB  0 (36)
VS  0 (37)
VBH  0 (38)
VSL = 0 (39)
5.2 Existence
In this section, we will prove that conditions (36) to (39) can be simultane-
ously satised and we will give a prole of strategies which constitutes such
an equilibrium.
The values of the VB and VBH imply that no buyer plays tough in
state H. So, Bl
H = 0. As VS  0, nS > 0 but since there is no tough
buyers in state H, the uninformed sellers do not have the time to switch to
a soft announcement. Indeed, they reach immediately an agreement with a
soft buyer. Hence, Sh
H = 1. With this last value, we check easily that VBH
is eectively lower than 0 for all  < 16. Then, nBH = 0 is compatible with
an equilibrium.
Now, remark that VB is the same that the one-sided case when Sh
H = 1
and VSL = 0 is identical in any case. So, Sh
L such that VSL = 0 will imply
the same Bl
L and the same value for VB.
For what follows, we need to be more precise in our notations. For un-
informed sellers, we denote VS(x) the dierence in expected gain between
nS = x + 1 and nS = x. So, what we designated previously as VS is now
designated as VS(0)
Given Bl
H = 0, the update of the beliefs of uninformed sellers is perfect,
i.e. in the second period on the market, they know that the state is L
(H = 0), since in state H there is no tough buyer. So, after one meeting
with a tough buyer, VS(x)8x  1 is given by
Bl




5A very close equilibrium would be such that VB  0, VS  0, VBH = 0 and
VSL  0.
6VBH = 0 when  = 1.
17So, it remains to check that VS(0)  0 for a newcomer and that will
be sucient to ensure the existence of this kind of equilibrium. For the
newcomers, taking into account Bl
H = 0, one can write
VS(0) = (1   H)VSL + H(pH   pM)
= H(pH   pM) > 0 (41)
The second equality is due to the fact that by construction of this equilibrium
VSL = 0. So, this equilibrium exists under the same conditions than his
equivalent in the one-sided case.






nS in state H = 1
nS in state L and nSL
7 are such that Bl
L = Bl
L().
It may be surprising that nS depends on the state of the world but it is
due to the fact that the learning is perfect for uninformed sellers.
5.3 Stationarity
We did not explicitly check that the equilibrium indeed satises the steady










H = 1 (45)
Hence, even if we do not write the conditions equivalent to (6), (7), (8) and
(9), we know that the stationarity of these proportions are guaranteed. The
conditions (4) and (5) are exactly the same for the two-sided case. It is easy





L are dierent from 0. It is indeed the case for all  < 1.





are integers. If it is not the case, we can say as in subsection 3 that a part of agents plays
tough during +1 periods while the remaining agents choose to immediately play soft.
186 Reconsidering the Noise Force
Gale (1987) was the rst to suspect that the presence of uninformed agents
on both sides of the market in Wolinsky (1990) was the source of the so
negative result in terms of information revelation. Serrano and Yosha (1993)
seemed to conrm the intuition of Gale (1987). The equilibrium that we
discover proves that noise is actually not needed to get imperfect information
revelation. This is not a real surprise since it was already proved by Blouin
and Serrano (2001) in a model relatively similar.
What is more interesting for our understanding of the noise force is the
equivalent equilibrium that we build for the two-sided case. Serrano and
Yosha (1993) explained as follows the noise force : As  ! 1 the informative
content of the pairwise meetings decreases because there are more uninformed
agents on both sides of the market trying to learn. Actually, this vision of
the noise force is not compatible with our equilibrium.
Indeed, in our equilibrium the unique agents who are uninformed are the
uninformed newcomers. Among them, buyers will spend only one period on
the market since they play always soft. Concerning the uninformed sellers,
they remain uninformed only during their rst period since one meeting
is sucient for them to learn with certainty the state of the world. The
proportion of uninformed agents on the market in state L and H are respec-
tively M
KL and M
KH. The second proportion is constant in our equilibrium
while M
KL is decreasing with . Indeed, the cost of misrepresenting decreases
and implies an increase of misrepresentations by the sellers. In other words,
more sellers are playing tough which induces more disagreements and nally
more agents remain on the market, i.e. KH increases with .
Hence, the noise force is not created by the fact that the proportion of
informed agents decreases on the market when  tends to 1. Indeed, this
proportion evolves in the opposite direction. Nevertheless, the presence of
uninformed agents on both sides of the market indeed creates a noise force.
This noise is due to the fact that nS = +1 and nB = +1 are clearly not
mutually compatible at a stationary equilibrium. If one or both strategies
are dierent from +1 then the probability of trading at a wrong price is
not nil. Remark that this argument is valid irrespective of the value of .
7 Conclusion
The main message of this work is : Frictions are positive. The result is very
strong since, surprisingly, nobody is injured by an increase in the level of
19frictions. Our result is established for the one-sided case but we show that
an equivalent equilibrium exists in the two-sided case. So, the message is
not specic to the one-sided case.
Nevertheless, we have to keep in mind the limits of the result; limits
which, at the same time, indicate directions for further research.
First, our work is restricted to some equilibria. In the one-sided case
for instance, if you consider an equilibrium with complete information rev-
elation, frictions are harmful in terms of welfare. The properties are less
obvious for the other equilibria in the two-sided case. It is really not impos-
sible for a rise in the level of frictions to be a bad thing for everybody in
some equilibria.
Second, we consider a particular model at least in two respects. The
rst particular feature is the assumption about the entry of new agents in
the market. It would be interesting to treat the same issue in a model
 a la Blouin and Serrano (2001) which departs from Wolinsky (1990) and
Serrano and Yosha (2003) concerning the entry of agents in the market.
The kind of information ignored by the uninformed agents constitutes the
second particular feature. In our context, the shadow information is a value
common to all agents. A natural extension would be to consider adverse
selection  a la Akerlof. Results for  ! 1 are already provided by Blouin
(2003).
Finally, what does a change in the level of frictions mean ? The best way
of thinking is to consider that  derives from an interest rate that we modify.
There exists another interpretation but which is somewhat problematic. One
could interpret a modication in the level of frictions as a change in the
physical time between two matchings. The problem of this conception is
that, actually, we modify at the same time the density per period of time of
the ow of new agents in the market. Nevertheless, it must be possible to
deal with this problem by dening M, the number of new entrants in the
market, as a function of . It is quite dicult to guess what would change
once this kind of modeling is adopted.
In addition to our main result, we get some very valuable byproducts.
The proof of the existence of an equilibrium with incomplete revelation
of information in the one-sided case is completely new. As discussed in
section three, some other equilibria with incomplete revelation might exist.
We produce also a reinterpretation of the noise which prevents complete
information revelation in the two-sided case.
In a certain sense, we conrm an intuition present in the literature :
the pairwise meetings market is a procedure with bad revelation properties
(only in some equilibria of the steady-state version of the one-sided model
20do some good equilibria show up). Gottardi and Serrano (2005) provide a
general discussion of this and related issues.
Nevertheless, as shown by Isaac (2010), the existence of an equilibrium
with complete information revelation is a robust result in the one-sided case
even when we execute a dynamic analysis, i.e. without assuming a priori
that the market is at a steady state. The result is actually stronger in Isaac
(2010): under some conditions, there exists a unique equilibrium. Due to
this uniqueness result, one could worry about the survival of our equilibrium
in a dynamic analysis. First, the condition for the uniqueness in Isaac (2010)
and the condition for the existence of our equilibrium are mutually exclusive.
Moreover, the existence of our equilibrium in a dynamic analysis is almost
proved in Isaac (2006). Only the last step is missing in Isaac (2006): the
proof that the equilibrium exists when  tends to 1. This step is a variation
of our proof.
Moreover, in Gottardi and Serrano (2005) the intuition to explain the
bad property of the matching procedure is that the matching process creates
a kind of monopoly power. This monopoly power would be larger when the
impatience of the agent increases. Hence, we expect that the situation is
better when  is higher. Actually, it is just the opposite in our result. So,
in that perspective, our work tends to indicate that the link is quite more
complex than expected between the modeling used in Gottardi and Serrano
(2005) and the one used in the literature following Wolinsky (1990).
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